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NOTE
PIVATE CLUB MEMBERSHW-WHERE
DOES PRIVACY END AND
DISCRIMINATION BEGIN?
To associate freely with others is a fundamental constitutional
right.1 Although this freedom is generally asserted affirmatively,2
courts have recognized that the freedom to associate implies the
right not to associate.3 Moreover, the right to associate freely has
' See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (association as a
"freedom ... central to our constitutional scheme"); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (freedom of association included in "liberty" guaranteed by four-
teenth amendment). In the Civil Rights Cases, Justice Harlan said in dissent, "I agree that
government has nothing to do with social, as distinguished from technically legal, rights of
individuals. No government ever has brought, or ever can bring, its people into social inter-
course against their wishes." The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 59 (1883) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). "The right of association is closely related to the right to believe as one chooses
and to the right of privacy in those beliefs." Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM.
L. REv. 1361, 1361 (1963). Justice Douglas' remarks, however, were reflective of the
NAACP's assertions that state government requirements at issue in NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson threatened the NAACP's very existence. See* id. at 1379. Note, however, that
Justice Douglas did not postulate an absolute right to associate, saying, "[g]overnment can
intervene . . . when belief, thought, or expression moves into the realm of action that is
inimical to society," Id. See generally G. ABERNATHY. THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND AssocIA-
TION (1961); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1986) [herein-
after NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG]. Abernathy identifies several important functions per-
formed by associations in a democratic society. Among the functions discussed is the
association's role in accustoming the individual to the necessity of acquiescence in majority
decisions in order to reduce the need for government controls, and its role in checking the
inherent dangers of tyranny by the majority. See G. ABERNATHY, supra, at 240-44.
' See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (associational
rights of members inhibited by requested submission of membership lists). Cf. Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 107 S. Ct. 544, 548 (1986) (right to associate for the advance-
ment of political beliefs); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244 (1957)
(lawyer could not be barred from practice based on prior Communist Party membership);
Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94 (1945) (blacks have a right to join labor
union).
' See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (deprivation of right to
refuse to associate violative of first amendment); NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 1,
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been bifurcated into two apparently distinct categories: freedom of
intimate or private association and freedom of expressive associa-
tion.4 Freedom of private association encompasses fundamental
freedoms within the penumbra of the concept of privacy, 5 while
freedom of expressive association is derived from the nexus be-
tween the express rights guaranteed by the first amendment and
the self-evident necessity for free association to effectuate these
rights.6
at 206-07; Comment, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: First Amendment
Limitations Upon State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047, 1067 (1985). See also Democratic Party of
United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (right not to associ-
ate with those holding adverse views); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89
YALE L.J. 624, 637 (1980) (freedom of intimate association "implies the choice not to associ-
ate oneself in intimate ways with the world at large" (emphasis in original)). But see Hishon
v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (requirment to consider an individual for part-
nership on merits does not infringe on right of association); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 470 (1973). The Norwood Court observed significantly that "[i]nvidious private dis-
crimination may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected
by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protec-
tions." Norwood, 413 U.S. at 470. Thus the Norwood Court refused to cloak "private bias"
with the salubrious values inherent in the first amendment. See id. at 469-70.
In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court suggested that laws could not
overcome social prejudices between blacks and whites. See id. at 551. However, the Court, in
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), disavowed the Plessy approach and held
segregation in public schools an inherent violation of equal educational opportunities. See
id. at 493. Thus the Court asserted the right of minority students to associate with whites
and rejected the argument that public schools could legally be segregated. See id. at 495.
4 See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1945 (1987);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. See generally 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 20.41, at 199-208 (1986) [hereinafter Ro-
TUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE].
' See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19. Courts have found privacy rights based on general
principles inherent in the Constitution, rather than on specific constitutional language. See,
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965) (receipt of contraceptive informa-
tion necessary to exercise fundamental right to make procreational choices). See also
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382-86 (1978) (state could not prohibit residents marriage
despite prior child support failures); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86
(1977) (state statute restricting distribution of contraceptives to pharmacists invalid);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (invalidating state statute
limiting occupants of single family dwelling to members of nuclear family); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (state abortion legislation violative of individual's privacy
rights); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (voiding state statute
prohibiting children from attending private schools); Karst, supra note 3, at 635 (intimate
associations "have a great deal to do with the formation and shaping of an individual's sense
of his own identity"). See generally 2 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE, supra note 4,
§ 15.7, at 79-86.
' See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). The Gilmore Court
noted that the "very exercise of the freedom to associate by some may serve to infringe that
freedom for others." Id. at 575. See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
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Historically, the right to associate freely with others for social
as well as political and' business purposes has been a hallmark of
equality.7 In the past two decades courts have been summoned to
balance the interests of groups aspiring toward equality against the
interests of individuals and groups seeking to maintain the status
quo through discriminatory institutions." Perhaps one of the most
controversial issues involved in this struggle concerns the extent to
which the government may constitutionally intrude into the crite-
ria for membership in "private" clubs.'
This Note will address the need for courts to develop a worka-
ble and comprehensive definition of the concept of the "private
club." Furthermore, it will examine the implications of discrimina-
907-09 (1982) (organized boycott of white merchants is protected expression); Larson v. Va-
lente, 456 U.S. 228, 244-46 (1982) (state statute requiring registration of religious organiza-
tions that obtain over half their funds from nonmembers violative of religious expression);
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978) (associational rights extend to lawyers seeking to
organize class action); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (NAACP's efforts to
solicit civil rights litigation essential to free expression); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (group membership list need not be disclosed if result would
chill associational freedom); Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977) (freedom of association is "little more than a shorthand
phrase used by the Court to protect traditional first amendment rights of speech and peti-
tion as exercised by individuals in groups"). See generally 2 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG,
TREATISE, supra note 4, § 18.28, at 562-68.
1 Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (negative effects of exclusion of
minorities on their self-image and achievement); Goodwin, Challenging the Private Club:
Sex Discrimination Plaintiffs Barred at the Door, 13 Sw. U.L. REV. 237, 271 (1982) (persons
deprived of right to participate fully in certain social institutinns will have diminished self-
image).
8 See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 308 (1969) (striking down membership policy
designed to keep recreational facility all white); Nesmith v. YMCA, 397 F.2d 96, 100 (4th
Cir. 1968) (YMCA could not restrict membership to whites). See also Henkin, Privacy and
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1430-33 (1974) (discussing need to balance public goods
against privacy interests); Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 82 MicH. L. REV. 1878, 1882-83 (1984) (viewing this balance as a clash between
"egalitarian and communitarian values"). Courts, therefore, have differed when evaluating
the relative importance of integration as compared to privacy rights. Compare Wright v.
Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1157 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (integration necessary in non-private
organizations to balance goal of racial integration against associational rights of members)
with Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1195 (D.
Conn. 1974) (privacy rights of members dominant over goal of integration).
' See, e.g., Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1943-45
(Rotary International required to accept woman member in local club); Kiwanis Int'l v.
Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 477 (3d Cir. 1986) (Kiwanis International's refusal
of woman's membership upheld in local club), rev'g 627 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.J.); New York
State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 215, 505 N.E.2d 915, 916, 513
N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (1987) (upholding local law which prohibits discrimination by private
clubs which provide benefits to non-members).
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tion by private clubs upon the associational rights of the members
of such clubs, as well as those excluded from membership. Initially,
this Note will review federal legislative restrictions in the area of
private club discrimination and then shift its focus to attempts by
states to limit discrimination through public accommodations stat-
utes. These governmental efforts will then be analyzed against the
paradigm of constitutional protections of the right to associate
freely. Ultimately, this Note will suggest a legislative approach
that equitably protects the rights of the conflicting parties through
permissible restrictions on discrimination by private clubs.
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
Post Civil War Legislation
At the time the Constitution was written, most Americans
viewed their individual state governments as buffers against the
potential tyranny of an omnipotent federal government. 10 How-
ever, in the aftermath of the Civil War, it became the federal gov-
ernment that adopted the role of protector of individual rights and
guarantor of equal protection.11 Through the thirteenth amend-
ment12 and the Civil Rights Act of 1866,'3 the federal government
20 See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294, 297 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
" See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from
abridging the rights of their citizens or denying equal protection of the laws to all people.
See id.
12 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1. The thirteenth amendment provides in pertinent part
that, "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist within the United States."
Id. See also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (private persons liable for abro-
gating thirteenth amendment rights); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968)
(thirteenth amendment protections applicable to individual and state action). See generally
2 ROTUNDA, NOWAK & YOUNG, TREATISE, supra note 4, §§ 19.6-19.10, at 739-53 (discussing
protections provided by thirteenth amendment).
"3 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1982 (1982)). Section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 reads in pertinent part:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power
. . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of
every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or invol-
untary servitude ... shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evi-
dence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal prop-
erty, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . ...
Id. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was based on the theory that to deny the enumerated rights
and privileges contained in the Constitution was to subject an individual to involuntary
servitude. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 91-92 (1873) (Field, J.,
dissenting).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:474
articulated a policy of protecting individuals' contractual and
property rights.14 Although this protection remained largely dor-
mant for a century following its enactment, it was revitalized in
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.15 when the Supreme Court held that
section 1982, enacted under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, extended
to private discrimination. 16 Section 1981, created by the same act,
also has been held applicable to private discrimination.1
Civil Rights Act of 1964
The modern era of civil rights legislation is marked by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 While this Act clearly prohibits racial
discrimination in the area of public accommodations, 9 Title II,
which provides an exemption for "private clubs,"20 has generated
considerable controversy as to the "private" nature of the wide va-
riety of groups that have claimed exemptions due to their "pri-
14 See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 440 (1973). See
also McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975) (restricting private school
admission to white students denies a contractual right to qualified black students), aff'd,
427 U.S. 160 (1976); Taylor v. Jones, 495 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (racially
motivated termination of employment violates 42 U.S.C. § 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 653 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1981).
15 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
16 See id. at 412. The Jones Court held that section 1982 applies to the purely private
sale of property. Relying on section two of the thirteenth amendment, the Court reasoned
that Congress had the authority to determine what constitutes "badges and incidents of
slavery" and to pass the appropriate legislation to eliminate them. See id. at 437-44. More-
over, the Court upheld the congressional determination that discrimination in real estate
sales was such an incident of slavery. See id. at 413. Thus, Congress could prevent a private
person from refusing to sell his house to another person solely on the basis of race. See id.
17 See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1199
(D. Conn. 1974). See also supra note 14 (cases analogize § 1982 and § 1981 as jointly ema-
nating from thirteenth amendment and extending to acts of private discrimination).
18 Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 243 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982)).
11 Section 2000a(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 describes a public accommodation
by citing a series of examples that would be illustrative of the type of entity that would be
covered. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1982). This section refers, however, solely to discrimina-
tion or segregation "on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin," and not to
equivalent acts on the basis of gender. See id. § 2000a(a).
"0 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1982). This subsection exempts from the provisions of the Act,
"a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent
that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons" of a
place of public accommodation. Id. See generally Note, The Private Club Exemption To
The Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1112 (1969)
(detailed look at developing standards used to determine status of assertedly private clubs
within context of racial discrimination actions under § 2000a(e)).
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vate" character.2' Courts generally have had little difficulty in re-
jecting claims for exemption brought by sham organizations
created solely to avoid the consequences of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.22 In dealing with alleged "private clubs," courts have out-
lined a series of factors to help determine whether a club that at-
tempted to exclude blacks from membership was indeed "truly
private. 2
3
2 See, e.g., Nesmith v. YMCA of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968). The Raleigh,
North Carolina YMCA claimed that its health and recreation facilities were private and
therefore exempt from the anti-discrimination provisions of the Act. See id. at 101. The
court, however, found that the YMCA, which had no limits on membership and no stan-
dards for admission, was not a private club within the meaning of the Act and thus was not
exempt. See id. at 102. See also Bell, Private Clubs and Public Judges: A Nonsubstantive
Debate About Symbols, 59 Tax. L. REv. 733, 739 (1981) (private club exemption "has
tempted a legion of public facilities to cloak discriminatory policies in private club garb").
22 See United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 530 (5th Cir. 1968). Richberg's Cafe,
which existed prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, segregated its custom-
ers by race. Id. at 525. At some time after the initiation of the instant suit, the Dixie Diner
Club was established on the premises of Richberg's Cafe. See id. The court determined that
this club was not within the exemption provided in section 2000a(e), because there was no
selectivity in membership, no club meetings were held, and there were no changes in food,
prices, or personnel from the former cafe. See id. See also United States v. Johnson Lake,
Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1380 (S.D. Ala. 1970) (association reincorporated as "private club"
subsequent to passage of Civil Rights Act of 1964 primarily to discriminate against blacks);
United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 379 (E.D. La. 1969) (public restaurant converted
to "private dining club" held not exempt); United States v. Beach Assocs., Inc., 286 F. Supp.
801, 807-09 (D. Md. 1968) (allegedly private beach club which admitted all white persons
enjoined from discriminating against black applicants); Note, supra note 20, at 1113-14
(criticizing criteria used by Supreme Court in evaluating Lake Nixon Club in Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298 (1969), as indistinct).
23 See Jordan, 302 F. Supp. at 371. In Jordan, the court was confronted with a for-
merly public restaurant which had incorporated as a private club and subsequently sought
to claim exemption from the anti-discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See id. at 371. The court adopted the government's brief which set forth in detail criteria
which may be utilized to determine the true status of an assertedly private club. See id. at
375-77. One broad category involves the degree of selectivity of the club, including the con-
trol of the existing members over the admission of applicants and the revocation of existing
membership. See id. at 375. Limits on club membership and any genuine qualifications for
membership are also scrutinized. See id. A second category a court will investigate involves
control of the operations of the "club." See id. at 375-76. Additionally, the ways in which
club membership is developed, with an emphasis on the degree of advertising aimed at the
public, will be a third criterion. See id. at 376. The court also cited the purpose of the club
and the formalities of membership as factors in the determination of private status. See id.
Senator Hubert Humphrey emphasized that the exemption was to protect only "the genuine
privacy of private clubs or other establishments whose membership is selective on some
reasonable basis." See 110 CONG. REC. 13,697 (1964) (emphasis added); see also Note, supra
note 20, at 1117-18 (factors courts will consider in determining whether, in context of fed-
eral legislation, a club is private).
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STATE PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS STATUTES
Although federal statutes remain an effective weapon against
racial discrimination in businesses affecting commerce,2 4 they pro-
vide no protection against sexually discriminatory membership
policies.25 During the past fifteen years the preferred alternative, in
attempting to scale back the all-male social bastions of America,
has been the state statute prohibiting discrimination in public ac-
commodations.28 However, since most state statutes are modelled
after Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they too include ex-
emptions for private clubs.27 Thus, state courts have had to define
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1982). Public accommodations must either affect com-
merce as defined in section 2000a(c), or be supported by state action as defined in section
2000a(d) in order to come within the reach of federal regulation. Id. The state action re-
quirement has been a substantial hurdle preventing application of section 2000a to member-
ship clubs. See, e.g., New York City Jaycees, Inc. v. United States Jaycees, Inc., 512 F.2d
856, 858-59 (2d Cir. 1975) (despite receipt of considerable governmental funds, state action
not present).
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1982). Subsection (b) limits the scope of the statute to
discrimination or segregation based on race, color, religion or national origin. See id. See
also Seidenberg v. McSorleys' Old Ale House, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 1253, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (civil rights protections of § 2000a(a) inapplicable to women); DeCrow v. Hotel Syra-
cuse Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530, 532 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (same).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act provides protections against sexual discrimination in
addition to the other forms of discrimination covered by Title II. For an interesting discus-
sion of the interrelation of Title VII provisions and state regulations and the effect of this
interrelation on the exemption of private clubs in the arena of employment discrimination,
see Garcia, Title VII Does Not Preempt State Regulation of Private Club Employment
Practices, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 1107 (1983). See also Bohemian Club v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 187 Cal. App. 3d 1, 231 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Ct. App. 1986) (preservation of
comraderie in all-male club does not justify sexually discriminatory hiring practices);
Guesby v. Kennedy, 580 F. Supp. 1280, 1284 (D. Kan. 1984) (right of association more lim-
ited in employment context than club membership context).
26 See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981) (Jaycees
considered place of public accommodation within meaning of state statute); United States
Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 452 N.E.2d 1199, 465
N.Y.S.2d 871 (1983) (boating clubs held to be places of public accommodation). See also
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (affirming determination by Min-
nesota Supreme Court that state public accommodation statute applied to Jaycees); Com-
ment, The Unruh Civil Rights Act: An Uncertain Guarantee, 31 UCLA L. REv. 443, 445
(1983) (states adopted public accommodations laws in response to Supreme Court's invali-
dation of federal public accommodation law); Note, Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 53 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1173, 1178 (1984) (prior to federal civil rights acts state public accommodation
laws were primary means of protecting disadvantaged groups); see generally B. BABcociK, A.
FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAUSES AND REMEDIES
1037-70 (1975); Project, Discrimination In Access To Public Places: A Survey of State and
Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215 (1978) [herein-
after Project].
27 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West Supp. 1987) (enumerated list of public
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their statutory terms to determine which organizations, because of
their private nature, fall within this exemption.28
Definition of "Place"
Most state civil rights statutes prohibit discrimination in
places of "public accommodation. '" 9 In National Organization for
Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc.,30 which involved a chal-
lenge to all-male baseball programs, Little League asserted that it
should not be considered a "place of public accommodation" be-
cause it did "not operate from any fixed parcel of real estate." 31
While pointing to some location-specific connections,32 the court
held the Little League to be a place of "public accommodation"
essentially because it was "open to children in the community at
large, with no restriction (other than sex) whatever." 33 The court
emphasized that the term "place" was a "term of convenience, not
of limitation." 34
Some membership clubs have successfully avoided anti-dis-
crimination provisions by claiming they did not operate from any
statutorily-required fixed location. 5 Refusing to follow the Little
accommodations and "distinctly private" exempted clubs).
28 See infra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West Supp. 1987). In an effort to exemplify the
concept of equality, state public accommodations laws have created a tension between the
goal of equal opportunity and the freedom of association. See Comment, Exclusion and
Access in Public Accommodations: First Amendment Limitations Upon State Law, 16 PAC.
L.J. 1047, 1047 (1985); Project, supra note 26, at 290-91; cf. Unruh Civil Rights Act, CAL.
CIv. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1987) (referring to business establishments of any kind rather
than places of public accommodation).
30 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33, aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974).
32 Id. at 530, 318 A.2d at 37.
2 See id. at 531, 318 A.2d at 37. The court pointed to the ball field at which the league
held its tryouts, gave instruction to the youngsters, and held practice and league games. See
id.
3 Id. at 531, 318 A.2d at 37-38 (emphasis in original). The court agreed with the hear-
ing officer of the Division of Civil Rights, that a place is a public accommodation if the
public is invited to attend. See id.
24 Id. at 531, 318 A.2d at 37. The Little League decision reflects the view that the term
"place" is used because it is the most convenient way to describe most public accommoda-
tions, which are "commonly provided at fixed 'places'." Id. at 530, 318 A.2d at 37. The court
cautioned, however, that the language of the statute should not be read restrictively so as to
defeat its remedial purpose. See id.
35 See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379, 1381 (D.C. 1981). Ap-
proaching the notion of "place" differently from the Little League court, the Bloomfield
court refused to apply the public accommodations statute of the District of Columbia to the
Jaycees because the club did "not operate from any particular place within the District of
Columbia." See id. The District of Columbia statute at issue contained a laundry list of
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League approach when interpreting statutes which define public
accommodations by example,38 some courts have found a fixed si-
tus to be essential.37 Several state legislatures, perhaps in anticipa-
tion of such possible limitations, have attempted to broaden their
statutory language to deemphasize the role of the fixed situs. 38
Definition of "Private"
Many courts that have gone beyond the definition of "place"
have been confronted with a statutory exemption for clubs that are
"private."3S Due to close structural parallels between the provi-
sions of section 2000a of the Civil Rights Act of 196440 and some
state public accommodations laws,4' particularly in the area of the
private club exemption, 2 the federal criteria used to determine
whether clubs are "private" are often helpful in state cases as
locations specifically denoted as places of public accommodations. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2202(x) (Supp. 1978). Other cases involving the Jaycees have followed the Bloomfiled court's
interpretation of "place." See, e.g., United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008, 1011
(Alaska 1983) (public accommodation status requires fixed physical location); United States
Jaycees v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 391 Mass. 594, 603, 463 N.E.2d
1151, 1156 (1984) (Jaycees not considered place of public accommodation because do not
maintain "place of operations" within state).
36 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(12) (1986). The Alaska statute defines a public
accommodation as:
a place that caters or offers its services, goods or facilities to the general public
and includes a public inn, restaurant, eating house, hotel, motel, soda fountain,
soft drink parlor, tavern, night club, roadhouse, place where food or spiritous or
malt liquors are sold for consumption, trailer park, resort, campground, barber
shop, beauty parlor, bathroom, resthouse, theater, swimming pool, skating rink,
golf course, cafe, ice cream parlor, transportation company and all other public
amusement and business establishments, subject only to the conditions and limi-
tations established by law and applicable alike to all persons.
Id.
I'7 See supra note 35.
8 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (West Supp. 1987). A place of public accommoda-
tion is "a business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transporta-
tion facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to
the public." Id. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1987). This section provides in
pertinent part that "[aill persons . . . no matter what their sex . . . are entitled to the full
and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business es-
tablishments of every kind whatsoever." Id. (emphasis added).
19 See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1982) (exempting from coverage "any
institution, club or place of accommodation which is in its nature distinctly private").
,0 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1982). See supra note 19 (discussion of § 2000a).
41 See supra note 36.
42 See supra notes 27 and 39 and accompanying text.
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well.43
While courts have enumerated a great many factors in evalu-
ating claims to private club status, the criterion central to this de-
termination is selectivity.44 Courts applying either the federal stat-
ute or its various state analogues repeatedly have analyzed the
standards by which a club selected its members. 45 Clubs that rou-
tinely admitted men of a certain age and social group while exclud-
ing similarly situated women have been held not to be "private. '46
Only recently have these attempts to delineate those clubs
that might or might not be permitted to discriminate in their
membership policies raised issues as to the extent of constitutional
protection afforded the freedom of association.
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION GENERALLY
As society has become increasingly technological and imper-
sonal, the individual has increasingly needed to join with others
who have similar objectives and interests.47 The importance of
43 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
4 See Rogers v. International Ass'n of Lions Clubs, 636 F. Supp. 1476, 1479-80 (E.D.
Mich. 1986); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1150-53 (S.D. Tex. 1970); United
States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 375-77 (E.D. La. 1969). Generally, courts have held that
the selection of new members must be based on some enumerated criteria and must include
screening by current members of applications for new membership. See Wright, 315 F.
Supp. at 1151. Without the actual operation of such screening, a finding that a club is "pri-
vate" is extremely unlikely. See id.
The anomalous results which can occur when clubs do not meet the selectivity criteria,
yet nevertheless claim to be "private," are exemplified by situations wherein entire groups,
such as women who are professionals in their respective fields, are excluded from clubs
solely because of their sex. Cf. Comment, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The
Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 460, 468-69 (1970) (discussion of harmful
effects of racial discrimination practiced by various clubs).
" See Wright, 315 F. Supp. at 1154. See also Rogers, 636 F. Supp. at 1479-80 (cursory
formal procedure for admission is not indicative of selectivity); United States v. Slidell
Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474, 485-86 (E.D. La. 1974) (2000 white applicants ac-
cepted by association without interviews, recommendations, or evaluations); United States
Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 412-13, 452 N.E.2d
1199, 1204-05, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876-77 (1983) ("no plan or purpose of exclusivity other
than sexual discrimination").
46 See Rogers, 636 F. Supp. at 1480; Power Squadrons, 59 N.Y.2d at 413-14, 452 N.E.2d
at 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
47 See G. ABERNATHY, supra note 1, at 171-73. However the need to join with others is
not a new phenomenon. Almost 150 years ago Alexis de Tocqueville observed:
The most natural privilege of man next to the right of acting for himself, is that of
combining his exertions with those of his fellow creatures and of acting in common
with them. The right of association therefore appears to be as almost inalienable
in its nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can attack it without
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group association in the development of one's own identity has
been acknowledged both by the Supreme Court and legal
commentators.48
Although the Constitution does not explicitly provide for a
freedom of association, courts have acknowledged that this right is
derived from the first amendment rights of freedom of speech and
assembly.49  Concurrently, courts have recognized associational
rights, derived from the penumbra of the Bill of Rights, that create
a zone of privacy protected from governmental interference. 0
In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,5 the Supreme Court
acknowledged initially the existence of a right to associate for the
purpose of advancing common goals or interests. 52 This right was
identified in the context of a court order that the NAACP provide
the State of Alabama with a complete list of names and addresses
impairing the foundations of society.
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 196 (Bradley ed. 1954). De Tocqueville, how-
ever, discussed this right in an inclusive rather than exclusive context. See id.
48 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984). Justice Brennan
characterized certain aspects of association as playing "a critical role in the culture" and
acting as "critical buffers between the individual and the power of the State." See id. at
618-19. See also Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64
N.C.L. REV. 303, 308-09 (importance of group membership in development of one's own
identity). Cf. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous. v. City of Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 294 (1981) (collective effort sometimes necessary to make individual voice heard).
19 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907-
09 (1982); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). Justice Doug-
las noted that the act of joining an organization could itself be a form of expression:
The right of "association". . . is more than the right to attend a meeting; it in-
cludes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a
group .... Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion; and
while it is not expressly included in the First Amendment its existence is neces-
sary in making the express guarantees fully meaningful.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (dicta).
50 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. "Right of Privacy is a zone of prima facie
autonomy, of presumptive immunity from regulation, in addition to that established by the
first amendment." Henkin, supra note 8, at 1425. Although Professor Henkin indicates that
some rights are so fundamental that they are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," he
emphasizes that most aspects of an individual's life are not "fundamental" and thus are
subject to presumptively valid statutory controls. See id. at 1425-26. See, e.g., Village of
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1974) (upholding zoning ordinance restricting use to
single family dwellings). Furthermore, even "fundamental rights" will have to yield to a
"compelling public good clearly established." See Henkin, supra note 8, at 1426.
5- 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
52 Id. at 460-61. The Court stated that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private
points of view ... is undeniably enhanced by group association.. ." Id. at 460. Furthermore,
the Court stressed that associational freedom is a basic component of due process under the
fourteenth amendment and "it is immaterial whether the beliefs . . . pertain to political,
economic, religious or cultural matters .. " Id.
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of all NAACP members in that state.5 3 Fearing the chilling effect
enforcement of such an order might have upon the first amend-
ment rights of the members, the Court found the disclosure order
to be an abridgment of the constitutional right to associate.5 Sub-
sequent cases have seen the freedom of association successfully
employed by political parties asserting their rights against various
governmental restrictions.5
Freedom From Coerced Association
Paradoxically, the right to associate implies a right not to as-
sociate with groups or individuals.56 Generally, this right has been
advanced by individuals seeking to avoid coerced associations.5 In
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,5 8 a group of teachers chal-
lenged agency shop requirements either to join the local union or
pay a fee equivalent to union dues.59 The teachers alleged, among
other things, a violation of their freedom of association because
they were being forced to contribute to an organization with which
they had ideological disagreements. ° The Court sustained the
claim that the use of compulsory union dues to fund extraneous
political causes violated the associational rights of teachers who
opposed such causes, but upheld the fee requirement to the extent
the fee reflected union expenditures made on behalf of all
employees."'
Two important cases involving the right to exclude, as an as-
pect of the freedom of association, left unsettled the basic issue of
whether private clubs have a right to discriminate, but have often
13 Id. at 451.
See id. at 462-63, 466.
€' See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 107 S. Ct. 544, 548 (1986); Democratic
Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 120-26 (1981); Cousins
v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487-91 (1975). In Tashjian, the plaintiffs challenged a state re-
quirement that voters in party primaries be members of that party. See Tashjian, 107 S. Ct.
at 546-47. The Republican Party prevailed in its assertion that such a rule, conflicting with
Republican desires to allow independent voters to vote in state primaries, was a violation of
associational freedom. See id. at 548-54.
"' See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 58-61 and 65-67 and accompanying text.
58 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
rO See id. at 211-13.
co See id. at 233-35. The employees alleged that the union was using a portion of the
collected fees to fund political causes "unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative" of the teachers. Id. at 234.
01 See id. at 235-36.
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been cited by parties seeking to exclude certain groups from mem-
bership in their association. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, a
black guest of a member challenged the lodge's refusal to serve
him.2 The plaintiff conceded the right of a private club to discrim-
inate but argued that the state's issuance of a license to sell alco-
holic beverages at the lodge was "state action" implicating the pro-
tection of the fourteenth amendment.6 3 Consequently, the Court
did not have to decide the right of a private club to discriminate,
and dicta as to the private nature of the club and the club's con-
comitant right to discriminate' cannot be considered conclusive
with reference to state public accommodation statutes. In Runyon
v. McCrary,"5 the Court refused to recognize the associational right
claim of a private school that denied admission of black children to
its all-white student body.6 The Court, however, specifically noted
that its decision did not address the issue of whether private social
clubs were similarly restricted in their right not to associate.6 7
These cases, however, did not directly question the right of a pri-
vate club to exclude certain categories of people as an element of a
constitutional right to associate. That question was addressed di-
rectly for the first time in Roberts v. United States Jaycees."
62 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See also Goodwin, supra note 7, at 247-48, 251-52 (evaluating
significance of Moose Lodge).
'3 407 U.S. at 171, 179 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
66 See id. at 171. The Court found Moose Lodge to be a private club, in the ordinary
meaning of that term, but it did not attempt a detailed analysis of that issue since it focused
on the question of state action. See id. at 172-77. In his dissent, Justice Douglas appeared to
support the right of private clubs to discriminate against minorities of all types, but he
argued that there was sufficient state action to bar further discrimination against blacks.
See id. 179-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Additional support for the freedom to associate is found in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965), which involved governmental intrusion into procreational matters. Al-
though the case did not involve social clubs, remarks by Justice Douglas have oft been cited
to support discriminatory practices within the borders of freedom of association. See id. at
483. Justice Douglas suggested that the right of association is "more than the right to attend
a meeting; it includes the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in
a group or by affiliation with it. . ." Id. See also Karst, supra note 3, at 624-26 (pointing to
Griswold as seminal case in expansion of concept of freedom of association).
63 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
66 See id. at 175-76. The Court acknowledged the right of parents to send their children
to "educational institutions that promote the belief that racial segregation is desirable," but
the Court refused to protect "the practice of excluding racial minorities from such institu-
tions. ... See id. at 176 (emphasis in original).
67 Id. at 167.
6- 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Subsequent to the decision in Roberts, the Jaycees voted to
admit women to all its chapters. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1984, at A8, col. 1.
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IMPACT OF Roberts v. United States Jaycees
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Minneapolis and St.
Paul chapters of the Jaycees began admitting women in 1974 and
1975, respectively."9 In response, the United States Jaycees im-
posed on the local chapters a series of sanctions and threatened to
revoke their local charters.70 Members of the chapters responded
by filing charges with the state department of human rights alleg-
ing discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights
Act.71 The Minnesota Supreme Court found the Act applicable to
any "public business facility" and found the Jaycees to fit within
that classification.7 2 In its analysis, the court stressed that mem-
bership in the Jaycees was solicited on a nonselective basis. 7-
The Jaycees sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal
court to prevent enforcement of the law by Minnesota state offi-
cials. Although the federal district court ruled against the Jaycees,
" See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 614. Under the national organization's by-laws, women pre-
viously had been allowed to participate as associate members who paid somewhat lower
dues, but women could not vote, hold office, or participate in certain activities. See id. at
613.
70 See id. at 614. In 1978, the chapters were advised that the national board of directors
would shortly consider a motion to revoke the charters of both offending chapters. See id.
7' See id.; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West Supp. 1987). Section 363.03(3) proscribes
denial of the "full and equal enjoyment... of a place of public accommodation because of
... sex." Id. For a history of the procedural background, see Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615-17.
72 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616; United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 774
(Minn. 1981).
7' See United States Jaycees, 305 N.W.2d at 771. The methods by which the Jaycees
recruited members indicated that membership was considered a product to be sold to the
general male public. See id. at 769. But the Minnesota Supreme Court created some confu-
sion by stating:
Private associations and organizations-those, for example, that are selective in
membership-are unaffected by Minn. Stat. § 363.01(18) (1980) [definition of
"public accommodations"]. Any suggestion that our decision today will affect such
groups is unfounded.
We, therefore, reject the national organization's suggestion that it be viewed
analogously to private organizations such as the Kiwanis International
Organization.
Id. at 771. The Supreme Court's subsequent adoption of the loose language of the Minne-
sota court has led to speculation that there are still ways around public accommodations
statutes. Cf. Comment, Roberts v. United States Jaycees: How Much Help For Women?, 8
HARv. WoMEN's L.J. 215, 224-26 (1985).
Recently, to clarify its statement in Roberts with respect to the private nature of
Kiwanis clubs, the Supreme Court stated that it had not evaluated whether Kiwanis clubs
were sufficiently private to merit constitutional protection exempting these clubs from state
public accommodations statutes. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 107
S. Ct. 1940, 1947 n.6 (1987). The Court failed, however, to provide any further guidance in
making such determinations. See id.
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thereby affirming a state agency's order requiring the Jaycees to
allow its local Minnesota chapters to admit women, 4 that ruling
was later reversed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.75 Focus-
ing on the tension between the anti-discrimination provisions of
the Minnesota public accommodations statute and the general
freedom of association,76 the circuit court distinguished a member-
ship club from a club which in reality merely provides commercial
goods or services.7 The court determined that the Jaycees fell into
the former category, 7  and suggested that only a compelling state
interest could justify a "direct and substantial" intrusion into
Jaycee affairs by proscribing male-only membership.79 Differentiat-
ing tangible goods and services from those involved in membership
qualifications, 0 the court found the state interest not sufficiently
compelling to override the associational rights of the Jaycees."'
The Supreme Court, however, supported Minnesota's highest
court, upholding the Minnesota statute and its application to the
Jaycees.82 In so doing, the Court, more importantly, identified a
framework for the analysis of associational freedom. 83
"' See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 615-16. The United States District Court entered judgment
in favor of state officials seeking to enforce the Minnesota Human Rights Act. See id. This
judgment was based, in part, on the ruling of the Minnesota Supreme Court that the
Jaycees was a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the statute. See id. at
616.
" See United States Jaycees v. McClure, 534 F. Supp. 766, 770-74 (D. Minn. 1982),
rev'd, 709 F.2d 1560 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub noma. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984).
71 See United States Jaycees, 709 F.2d at 1566-68.
7 See id. at 1571. The court characterized the Jaycees as "a genuine membership or-
ganization, whose members govern its affairs and decide its policies," rather than merely a
way to deliver commercial goods and services. See id.
78 See id.
71 See id. at 1572.
80 See id. at 1573.
81 See id. at 1576.
82 See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 630-31 (1984). Unfortunately, the
Court did not sufficiently explore the parameters of a "private" club in such cases. "[Tihe
Court must be criticized for adopting Minnesota's functional definition of 'goods and ser-
vices'" rather than delineating clear guidelines to assist lower courts. See Note, Roberts v.
United States Jaycees: What Price Freedom of Association?, 1985 DE'. C.L. REv. 149, 160
[hereinafter Note, What Price Freedom]; Note, supra note 26, at 1187 (constitutional pro-
tection afforded various categories of organizations unclear from Roberts decision).
83 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. This framework involved the division of freedom of
association into two distinct freedoms-freedom of intimate association and freedom of ex-
pressive association. See id.
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Freedom of Intimate Association
The Roberts Court stressed its concern that "choices to enter
into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be
secured against undue intrusion by the State. 's4 Characterizing in-
timate associations as "an intrinsic element of personal liberty, '8 5
the Court specifically identified family relationships as examples of
such intimate associations. However, the Court did not limit this
category to that narrow grouping but rather delineated certain at-
tributes of groups that would implicate the freedom of intimate
association."' It suggested that this freedom might best be viewed
as a continuum which decreases in magnitude as the size of the
group increases and its selectivity decreases.8 7 Finding the Jaycees
large and unselective in its membership policies, the Court did not
find it necessary to delineate the outer parameters of this central
concept."8
Freedom of intimate association remains a significant, al-
though relatively uncharted area of interest. The Court has not
clarified the relationship between size and selectivity,89 and has not
" See id.
85 See id. at 620.
11 See id. at 619-20. The Court identified certain characteristics such as relative small-
ness, high degree of selectivity in admissions and retention, and need for privacy in certain
key aspects of the relationship. See id. at 620; see also Karst, supra note 3, at 629-30 (na-
ture and value of intimate association).
17 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620. Between the polar extremes of the large business and
the nuclear family there is a broad range of relationships which would invoke a range of
constitutional protections against state interference. See id.
" See id. at 620-21. While the local chapters of the Jaycees were characterized as basi-
cally unselective, it is unclear whether selectivity by the local club would have altered the
Court's analysis. See id. at 621. Both Minnesota chapters had approximately 400 members.
Furthermore, there were no criteria for membership, and apparently age and sex were the
only reasons why applicants were ever rejected. See id. Because women had already been
active participants in many of the organization's social events, privacy concerns were consid-
ered to be of minimal importance. See id.
8 See id. at 619-20. Courts have not yet confronted the difficult problems of defining
how far beyond the family unit the freedom of intimate association extends nor the extent
to which such freedom is immune from compelling state interests. In Roberts, there was a
very large national organization with virtually no selectivity apart from gender. See id. at
613, 621. In Rotary Club, the Court once again was faced with a large and impersonal organ-
ization. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 107 S. Ct. 1940, 1946 (1987).
To date, the Court has not had to address the issue as applied to a much smaller group with
clearly selective membership practices, but with an avowedly racist or sexist bias. The Court
indicates that "certain kinds of highly personal relationships" are to be granted a wide area
in which to operate. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618. But even here, the Court has implied that
certain policy objectives would justify state intervention. See id.
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identified the extent to which the freedom of intimate association
may exist beyond the scope of the family unit.90 The Court appears
to be suggesting that as the interests of intimate association in-
crease, the interests of the state must, of necessity, diminish. It is
submitted that a small club, which comprises several dozen friends
who value the congenial atmosphere of their group and is unre-
lated to commercial activity, should be included within the param-
eters of intimate association.91
Finding the freedom of intimate association inapplicable to
the Jaycees,92 the Roberts Court elaborated on the other branch of
associational freedom-freedom of expressive association.93
Freedom of Expressive Association
It is clearly recognized that people have the right to associate
in pursuit of activities protected by the first amendment.94 How-
ever, this right may be subject to restriction when the state em-
ploys the least restrictive means to achieve compelling state inter-
ests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas expressed through such
association. 5 Denoting Minnesota's "strong historical commitment
to eliminating discrimination," the Roberts Court summarily found
the existence of a compelling state interest.9 More accurately, the
Court's opinion indicated that it did not believe the admission of
women to the Jaycees would prevent the organization from engag-
o See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-20. Association with others is significant in developing
one's cultural identity. See Karst, supra note 48, at 339. We learn to trust the members of
our own cultural group as we learn what to expect from them; "[c]onversely, distrust of the
members of a different cultural group flows from fear ... that outsiders threaten our own
acculturated views of the natural order of society." Id. at 309.
91 The implication is that in such an intimate group associational rights would be par-
ticularly strong while state interests would be quite minimal with respect to such a group.
See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
92 See id. at 621.
' See id. at 622.
:4 See id.
See id. at 623.
9' See id. at 623-24. Discrimination based on sexual stereotyping "deprives persons of
their individual dignity and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political,
economic and cultural life." Id. at 625. Furthermore, a state has broad authority to create
equal access rights for its citizens. See id. at 625-26; see also United States Jaycees v. Mc-
Clure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 766-68 (Minn. 1981) (citing legislative history and broad language of
Minnesota statute and longstanding state interest in full equality). But see Linder, supra
note 8, at 1891-92 (suggesting that Justice Brennan may not have been fully persuaded by
his own "compelling interest" argument).
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ing in its various activities or expressing its views. The Court
failed to discuss the outcome of a situation in which such expres-
sive rights would directly be curtailed by modifications in member-
ship policies.
Unfortunately, the Roberts Court failed to evaluate carefully
the underlying characterization of the Jaycees as a "public accom-
modation." By merely accepting the determination of the Minne-
sota court, the Supreme Court has left this important issue unil-
luminated. Apparently, the Court prefers to allow each state to
determine for itself what is a "private club." ' Although this allows
for diversity and flexibility, it obfuscates the constitutional argu-
ments resulting from the Court's failure to relate the state's statu-
tory definition in the Minnesota Act to any possible protections
under the freedom of intimate association.99
CLUB DISCRIMINATION SINCE Roberts
The Roberts decision appeared to promise clarification of the
limitations on the rights of private clubs to discriminate in the
context of membership policies. 100 Recent cases, however, have il-
lustrated that Roberts has not prevented litigation in this area nor
has it resolved some basic areas of uncertainty.101
97 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. The Court did not believe that the Jaycees' expressive
activities would be hampered by the admission of women. See id. However, the Court, find-
ing no support in the record, chose not to address potential changes in the basic philosophy
of the organization which might necessarily result if women become full voting members.
See id. If such a basic interest is not really endangered, it is unclear why the Court finds it
necessary to invoke a "compelling interest" test. One possible explanation relates to a di-
chotomy between belief and action, which the Court mentions but does not pursue fully,
saying, "like violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special
harms distinct from their communicative impact, such practices are entitled to no constitu-
tional protection." See id. at 628.
11 See id. at 629-30. See also Note, What Price Freedom, supra note 82, at 160 (criticiz-
ing Roberts Court's unclear and result-oriented analysis).
11 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621. The statutes, in those states that consider membership
organizations to be places of public accommodation, illustrate a concern that discriminatory
membership policies be proscribed, but allow an exemption for private clubs. See, e.g., N.Y.
ExEc. LAw § 292(9) (McKinney 1982) (explicitly exempting private clubs); see also United
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 771 (Minn. 1981) (private organizations unaf-
fected by Minnesota Human Rights Act).
109 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-20. In light of the factual findings upon which Roberts
is based, the decision may hold merely that a very large and unselective national organiza-
tion whose expressive interests would be only incidentally affected, if at all, by the admis-
sion of women, cannot refuse to admit women. See id.
191 See infra notes 103-44 and the accompanying text. See also Feldblum, Krent &
Watkin, Legal Challenges to All-Female Organizations, 21 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 171, 173
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In Kiwanis International v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club"2 a fed-
eral district court faced a situation factually analogous to Rob-
erts.10 3 The Ridgewood club admitted, for club membership, a wo-
man, a local art consultant who fulfilled all the club's criteria,
except gender. 10 4 When her application was forwarded, Kiwanis In-
ternational refused to accept her and revoked the Ridgewood
Club's license to use any Kiwanis marks.10 5
Focusing primarily on assertions that the Kiwanis Interna-
tional was so "distinctly private" as to be exempt from the provi-
sions of the New Jersey anti-discrimination statute,' the district
court attempted to apply well settled criteria, including the Rob-
erts framework. 0 7 Identifying the general parameters of the con-
tinuum of associational freedom, 08 the court examined the goals of
(1986) (single-sex organizations advocated for women to compensate for societal disadvan-
tages). "When males are excluded from all-female organizations in today's society, this ex-
clusion does not create the same stigma or economic disadvatages as does the exclusion of
females from all-male organizations." Id. at 216.
12 627 F. Supp. 1381 (D.N.J.), rev'd, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986).
103 See id. at 1383-85. This case is similar to Roberts in that both involve large national
organizations attempting to enforce sexually restrictive membership policies against local
chapters that voluntarily admit women.
'0' See id. at 1384. While Kiwanis International limited its membership to men, it im-
posed other restrictions on prospective members, such as employment in a profession or
recognized trade that, in and of themselves, would not have operated to bar women. See id.
at 1383-84. Ms. Fletcher's occupation as an art consultant would have fulfilled Kiwanis In-
ternational's qualifications. Id. Moreover, she was willing to comply with the additional re-
quirements of the Ridgewood chapter, which demanded regular attendance plus a willing-
ness to pray and recite the pledge of allegiance at meetings. Id.
1"' See id. at 1385. Judge Sarokin noted the novel twist of revoking the offending club's
license to use Kiwanis' marks and symbols rather than revoking that club's charter, but he
properly dismissed this distinction as immaterial to the outcome of the case. See id. at 1385-
86. Kiwanis International argued, in effect, that the federal Lanham Act preempted the field
of trademark law, thereby denying to the state the authority to enforce its anti-discrimina-
tion statute. See id. at 1390. In response to Kiwanis International's argument that enforce-
ment would mean women would be admitted in some states and not in others, thus creating
trademark confusion, the judge replied, "[N]onsense." See id. at 1390-91.
106 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(l) (West Supp. 1987). Section 10:5-5(t) provides in per-
tinent part:
"A place of public accommodation" shall include, but not be limited to: any tav-
ern, roadhouse, hotel, motel .... restaurant, eating house, or place where food is
sold for consumption on the premises . . . . Nothing herein contained shall be
construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of
accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private ....
Id.
107 See Kiwanis Int'l, 627 F. Supp. at 1387-90.
"' See id. at 1383. The court succinctly paraphrased the Roberts Court, recognizing
that as one goes beyond the scope of the family unit towards a clearly public organization,
there is a point at which the court, balancing the associational rights of the exclusionary
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the organization, its size, its process for membership selection, and
the benefits accruing from membership.109 Consequently, as in
Roberts, the court found no abrogation of the freedom of intimate
association.110 As to the freedom of expressive association, the
court followed Roberts in finding that the admission of women
would have a negligible impact on the stated goals of Kiwanis In-
ternational."" In balancing the slight impingement of expressive
association against the state's compelling interest in eliminating
discrimination, 1 2 the court rejected the claims that Kiwanis Inter-
national should be exempt from the New Jersey statute or that its
constitutional rights of free association were impermissibly in-
fringed upon.113
Subsequently, the district court was reversed by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.1 4 Examining the selectivity of the
local Ridgewood Kiwanis club and the special admission require-
ments imposed on local club members, the circuit court found,
without reaching the constitutional issues directly, 1 5 the local
chapter to be "distinctly private" within the meaning of the New
Jersey statute, and thus exempt from its prohibition against dis-
crimination."1 6 It is submitted that the Third Circuit misapplied
group against the individual's right to be free from discriminatory treatment, must rule in
favor of the individual. See id.
1"9 See id. at 1383. Kiwanis consists of some 8,200 local clubs with over 300,000 mem-
bers worldwide. Its purpose is the performance of charitable service to the community
rather than merely the promotion of comraderie. Kiwanis' objectives include giving "pri-
macy to the human and spiritual ... values of life," and a series of equally virtuous values
that seem inapposite to the practice of discrimination. See id. at 1383. This latter point is
important in evaluating the impact of admitting women on the organization's expressive
freedom. See id. at 1389-90.
110 See id. at 1389. The court found the organization to have none of the attributes of
intimate association. See id.
"' See id. The exclusion of women from full membership in the organization is con-
trary to the mission of an organization which "purports to-and indeed does-embody and
encourage the most communitarian and charitable of social activities. . . ." See id.
11 See id. New Jersey, historically, has had a firm commitment to the eradication of
discrimination. See id.
"I See id. at 1389-90.
1' Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986). It is argued
that the decision of the circuit court demonstrates the continuing confusion in the applica-
tion of state anti-discrimination statutes and evaluation of freedom of association concerns
subsequent to the Roberts decision.
Il See id. at 476, 477. The court did not have to balance the compelling interest behind
the statute against any associational rights since it found the statute inapplicable to the
Ridgewood Kiwanis. See id. at 477.
"' See id. The court focused on whether or not Kiwanis was a place of public accom-
modation or a bona fide club exempted from the statute's coverage due to its distinctly
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the criteria for determining "distinctly private" status as it should
have focused its inquiry on the international organization rather
than on the local chapter. Thus, the Kiwanis court has allowed sex
based discrimination in membership by a basically unselective or-
ganization of over 300,000 members and, in the process, has fur-
ther confused the issue of precisely what constitutes "distinctly
private" in state statutes which provide for similar private club
exemptions. 117
To avoid potential confusion, California has broadly defined
public accommodations to encompass "all business establishments
of every kind whatsoever."" 8 California's Unruh Act exemplifies a
strong legislative commitment towards equal treatment for both
men and women."19 In that context, a California court, in Rotary
private nature. See id. at 476. The court recognized that the key question was selectivity in
membership admissions. See id. at 473.
Unfortunately, the court put excessive emphasis on the district court's mention that
Kiwanis Ridgewood meetings were held in public restaurants. See id. at 474. Correctly not-
ing that merely meeting in a public restaurant did not result in the club becoming a public
accommodation, the court failed to recognize that this fact was not the basis of the district
court's decision. See id. at 474-75.
117 See id. at 475. The court erroneously focused on the membership practices of the
Ridgewood Kiwanis chapter and found sufficient selectivity to qualify as a distinctly private
club since the chapter had only twenty-eight members, ten of whom had been members for
over twenty years. See id. But cf. United States v. Trustees of Fraternal Order of Eagles,
472 F. Supp. 1174 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (club requiring new members be recommended by two
members not private within 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e)).
The circuit court failed to inquire as to the numbers of applicants rejected or the crite-
ria by which members were or were not rejected. See Kiwanis Int'l, 806 F.2d at 475-76.
Moreover, the court refused to recognize the broad scope of membership solicitations used
by Kiwanis International and minimized the effect of the local chapter's mailings to dozens
of corporations in the Ridgewood area, which sought new members for the club. See id.
Courts generally will look beyond the formalities, such as sponsorship, to evaluate the
true selectivity of the process. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Eagles, 472 F. Supp. at 1176
(analyzed selectivity process according to actual, not asserted, practices). Rather, the Third
Circuit suggests that so long as there is any pretense of selectivity, the club is not "open and
unrestricted" in membership policy and is therefore a private club. See Kiwanis Int'l, 806
F.2d at 475-76. More problematic is the court's decision to focus on the characteristics of
the local chapter rather than that of the international organization. This seems particularly
significant since Kiwanis Ridgewood did vote to admit a woman to membership and it was
Kiwanis International that refused to accept her application. See id. at 470-71. The circuit
court refused a request for a rehearing eh banc. Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club,
811 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1987). However, Judge Sloviter, in a persuasive dissent, suggested the
court's decision had misapplied New Jersey's statutes and legal precedent. See id. at 248-53
(Sloviter, J., dissenting).
" CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (Deering Supp. 1987). Section 51 is also known as the Unruh
Civil Rights Act. Id.
19 See Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d
1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987) (Unruh Act prohibits direct
1987] PRIVATE CLUB DISCRIMINATION
Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary International,120
ordered the reinstatement of a local Rotary club whose charter had
been revoked for declining to enforce a male-only membership
policy. 12
1
Although the court looked at policies and activities of the local
Duarte Rotary club, a central issue was whether the Rotary Inter-
national was a "business establishment" within the meaning of the
statute. 122 Upon careful evaluation, it was determined that the Ro-
tary International "exhibit[ed] substantial businesslike attributes"
and was within the parameters of the Unruh Act.123
The Duarte court effectively illustrated that "substantial busi-
ness benefits" were available through membership in the Rotary or
similar organizations. 24 Such clubs provide contacts with leaders
of the business and industrial communities and are considered so
important that many businesses pay their employees' club mem-
bership dues.125 Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Service has ap-
proved business deductions for membership dues in such organiza-
tions, thereby recognizing a business rather than primarily social
discrimination against women).
120 Id.
121 See id. at 1067-68, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 232-33.
122 See id. at 1051, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 221. Compare the focus of this court on the policies
and activities of the International Rotary, see id., with the flawed approach taken in
Kiwanis Int'l, which analyzed the policies of the local chapter. See supra note 117 and
accompanying text.
123 See Rotary Club of Duarte, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1053, 1055, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 223,
224. In finding that the International Rotary was a "business establishment" within the
Unruh Act, the court analyzed the association's internal organization along with its financial
and administrative policies. See id. at 1051-52, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 222. The principal source of
the International Rotary's income derived from per capita dues from local clubs, other fees,
sale of publications, and other business-like activities. See id. The fact that its central office
was divided into six divisions helped support the notion that this was a "businesslike" oper-
ation. See id. at 1052-53, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 222-23. Particularly suspect was the publication
of an official magazine, the Rotarian, to which members were required to subscribe and
which, consequently, was a major source of revenues. See id. at 1054, 224 Cal. Rptr. 223.
12 See id. at 1055, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 224. "The primary purpose for the formation of the
Rotary movement was commercial advantage" through the connection between social inter-
course and business opportunities. See id. at 1055-56, 224 Cal. Rptr. 224-25 (citing the basic
Rotary Library).
'1 See id. at 1056-57, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 225. Richard Key, president of Duarte's Rotary
Club at the time its charter was revoked by the International, testified that significant com-
mercial advantage was available through club membership and that he had successfully de-
ducted his membership dues from his federal income taxes. See id. at 1055, 224 Cal. Rptr. at
225. Additional testimony cited by the court adds further support to the claim that commer-
cial advantage is not only a by-product of Rotary membership, but also an important part of
the commercially oriented agenda of those in the Rotary. See id., 224 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26.
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purpose in such membership.126
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the ruling
of the California Court of Appeals. 127 In Duarte, the first chance
for the Court to elaborate on its Roberts framework, the Court
broke little new ground. While focusing on the business related ele-
ments of Rotary Clubs,128 the Court recognized the absence of clear
boundaries for activities within the protection of intimate or pri-
vate association,'129 but found that the relationships among Rotary
Club members were not so private as to warrant this form of asso-
ciational protection.130 With respect to the protections afforded to
expressive association, the Court enumerated a variety of reasons
why the admission of women would not inhibit the members' abil-
ity to effectuate the purposes of Rotary.'
The Court failed, however, to clarify the parameters of private
association outside the limited examples enumerated in the Rotary
Club and Roberts decisions. In a footnote, the Rotary Club Court
did note that it had not concluded in the Roberts case that
Kiwanis clubs did indeed involve relationships private or intimate
enough to merit constitutional protection.3 2 Rather, the Court
opened the door for further ambiguity by proposing that each club
would have to be judged based on the "objective characteristics of
the particular relationships at issue. '
Legislative Definition
A legislative definition of a private club was upheld in New
12I See id. at 1056-57, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 225. Richard Key stated that an Internal Reve-
nue audit of his returns found the deduction of his Rotary dues to be a proper business
expense. See id.
17 Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987).
128 Id. at 1944.
29 Id. at 1945. The Court cited marriage, begetting and bearing children, child rearing
and education, and cohabitation with relatives as examples of protected intimate activities.
See id. at 1945-46.
130 Id. at 1946.
21 See id. at 1947. The Court points to the apolitical nature of Rotary Clubs which are
prohibited from taking positions on public questions. See id. In addition, no conflict existed
between Rotary's goal of humanitarian service and the admission of women. See id. As in
Roberts, the Rotary Court found that any slight infringement on expression was appropriate
in light of the state's compelling interest in providing women with equal access to leadership
skills and business contacts. See id. at 1948.
12 See id. at 1947, n.6.
13' See id.
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York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York."' In 1984,
the City Council of the City of New York ("City Council") passed
Local Law 63135 to deal with discrimination by clubs of over 400
members that are used primarily for business rather than social
purposes.3 Determining that these large clubs, which regularly
provided meal service during which business was conducted, were
pervaded by business activity,13 7 the City Council decreed that
such clubs could not be "distinctly private" so as to be exempt
from the anti-discrimination provisions of the public accommoda-
tions law.138
134 69 N.Y.2d 211, 215, 505 N.E.2d 915, 916, 513 N.Y.S.2d 349, 350 (1987).
115 NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1987). This law broadly defines a place of
public accommodations. See id. It excludes from coverage:
any institution, club or place of accommodation which proves that it is in its
nature distinctly private. An institution, club or place of public accommodation
shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private if it has more than four
hundred members, provides regular meal service and regularly receives payment
for dues, fees, use of space, facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indi-
rectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the furtherance of his trade or
business.
Id. See also supra notes 36 and 106 (comparison of similar statutes enacted in other states).
"' See New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 216, 505 N.E.2d at 916, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 350. See also Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and
Right To Privacy, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1181, 1189 ("city clubs may be more important than coun-
try clubs for business and job promotion"); Note, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, 29
HASTINGS L.J. 417, 418 (1977) ("Those 'sacred' men's bars and lunchrooms are the embodi-
ment of a strong idea: that discrimination on the ground of sex is reasonable, even natu-
ral-not as harmful, somehow, as racial or religious bias.") (quoting Harkins, Sex and the
City Council, NEW YORK MAG., Apr. 27, 1970, at 10).
"7 See Legislative Declaration, New York, N.Y., [1984] N.Y. Local Law No. 63, § 1
[hereinafter Legislative Declaration]. The focus of the law affects city eating clubs, which
are extremely important for the conduct of business and professional promotion. See also
Note, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, supra note 136, at 419 n.8 ("Social clubs...
are gathering places for the establishment") (quoted in B. BABcOCK, A FREEDMAN, E. NOR-
TON & S. Ross, SEX DIsCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 1057 (1975)).
"I See Legislative Declaration, supra note 137. The City Council declared that it had a
"compelling interest in providing its citizens... [with] ... an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in the City's business and professional life." See id. Furthermore, the City Council
found a barrier to the advancement of women and minorities could be traced to discrimina-
tory membership practices of certain clubs where members could gain personal contacts and
consummate business deals that would aid in their professional advancement. See id. De-
spite the fact that such clubs are ostensibly organized for other than business purposes and
indeed often perform valuable community services, the City Council found that if clubs: (1)
have more than 400 members; (2) provide regular meal service; and (3) receive fees and dues
from or on behalf of nonmembers, they will be deemed to be organized for business pur-
poses. See id. See generally Burns, The Exclusion of Women From Influential Men's
Clubs: The Inner Sanctum and the Myth of Full Equality, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321
(1983) (detailed description of role of elite mien's clubs in development of America's top
corporate and political leadership).
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The New York Court of Appeals upheld the law against chal-
lenges that it impermissibly conflicted with the state's anti-dis-
crimination law and that it violated the associational rights of the
members of the affected clubs. 139 Finding the state's more general
definition of a "place of public accommodation" not inconsistent
with Local Law 63, the court held that the city's definition was not
violative of any home rule provisions.140 However, Local Law 63
does not prohibit consideration of the general factors which have
been dispositive of distinctly private status in New York State.'"
In essence, the court noted that those clubs which meet the City
Council's "three-prong test, 14 2 as contained in the language of Lo-
cal Law 63, wvill be deemed to have lost the "essential characteris-
tic of selectivity" and instead have become "affected with a public
interest" so as not to be "distinctly private.' 14 3 Although satisfac-
tion of the three-prong test was not conclusive evidence that a club
was not "distinctly private," the court suggested that the burden
shifted to the club to prove that it was distinctly private notwith-
standing satisfaction of the three-prong test.'
"' See New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 216, 505 N.E.2d at 919, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 354.
140 See id. at 220, 505 N.E.2d at 919, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 353. New York does not define a
"distinctly private" club, see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9) (McKinney 1986), while the city regu-
lation provides a detailed description of those facilities that will be deemed not to be dis-
tinctly private. See NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(a) (1987).
"' See New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 220, 505 N.E.2d at 919, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 353. The New York State Club Ass'n court delineated five factors in determining the
status of a place of accommodation as either public or distinctly private: (1) whether the
club has a well-settled and standing procedure that is actually followed by which applicants
may be screened; (2) whether the club limits the use of its facilities and services to members
and their guests; (3) whether the club is, in fact, controlled by its members; (4) whether the
club is operated for the benefit and pleasure of its members rather than for profit; and (5)
whether the club solicits amongst the general public for membership in the club. See id.
These five factors initially were adopted by the New York court in United States Power
Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Board, 59 N.Y.2d 401, 412-13, 452 N.E.2d 1199,
1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (1983), which ordered a boating club that denied admission to
women to abandon its male-only membership policy because the club was not distinctly
private. Cf. Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (delineated fac-
tors to determine whether club is place of public accommodation within 42 U.S.C. § 2000a
or private and exempt within § 2000a(e)).
142 See supra note 135. The three elements required to place a club within the coverage
of Local Law 63 are termed the "three-prong test": the club must have at least 400 mem-
bers; must provide regular meal service; and must receive payments from or on behalf of
nonmembers to further the members' trade or business interests. See NEW YORK, N.Y., AD-
MIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1987).
'~ See id.
'" See New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 222, 505 N.E.2d at 920, 513 N.Y.S.2d
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The court of appeals, reading the Power Squadrons test 145 into
Local Law 63, found that Local Law 63 was no more restrictive of
the freedom of intimate association than the factual context that
existed in Roberts.14 Moreover, finding "compelling governmental
interests unrelated to the suppression of ideas," the court held that
any incidental infringement on the freedom of expressive associa-
tion was justified. 147
It is submitted that the New York City approach has merit
and should serve as a guideline for states and municipalities. The
statute attempts to protect those clubs which are small and pri-
marily non-business in nature, while preventing discrimination by
large, powerful clubs that may hold the key to business contacts.
Although questions arise as to whether smaller groups might not
still be within the anti-discrimination provisions of the state public
accommodations law and whether the city law improperly excludes
fraternal organizations, it is a reasonable legislative framework
which subsequently may be enhanced by judicial gloss as cases
arise. Moreover, the court's interpretation in New York Club Asso-
ciation makes Local Law 63 specific enough to denote those orga-
nizations within its scope, while simultaneously retaining sufficient
flexibility to assuage concerns as to the associational freedoms of
groups that are distinctly private.148
at 354.
'41 In Power Squadrons, the court identified a variety of factors to be considered in
determining whether a club is private; among these were factors similar to those consider by
other courts that have focused on selectivity as a key to private club status. See United
States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights Appeal Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 401, 412-13, 452
N.E.2d 1199, 1205, 465 N.Y.S.2d 871, 876 (1983).
116 See New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 223, 505 N.E.2d at 921, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 355. The compelling interest-the elimination of discrimination against women and mi-
norities-is sufficient to justify any incidental infringement unrelated to expressive associa-
tion. See id. at 224, 505 N.E.2d at 921, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 355. See also Roberts v. United
States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984) (freedom of expressive association not absolute and
subject to restrictions unrelated to expression).
M New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 223, 505 N.E.2d at 921, 513 N.Y.S.2d at
355. Prior to New York State Club Ass'n it might have been thought that no club with over
four hundred members which satisfied the other prongs of Local Law 63 could ever be "dis-
tinctly private," and that this would violate the freedom of intimate association of such
groups, which might otherwise have fit within the private category. See Brief for Appellants
at 23-24, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 211, 505 N.E.2d 915,
513 N.Y.S.2d 349 (1987); see also New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 222, 505 N.E.2d
at 920, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 354 (criteria enumerated in Power Squadrons must be read into city
law).
148 See New York State Club Ass'n, 69 N.Y.2d at 222, 505 N.E.2d at 920, 513 N.Y.S.2d
at 354.
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CONCLUSION
The freedom of association presently exists in a troubling
whirlpool of conflicting rights. Whereas freedom of association has
been used historically by the oppressed and victimized to gain
equality, it is increasingly being summoned to champion the cause
of discrimination. This dilemma produces a direct confrontation
between conflicting good values in our society. 149
To fully understand the problem, we need briefly retrace the
foundation of the concept of freedom of association. Professor
Emerson has noted that "it is the individual who is the ultimate
concern of the social order.' 150 Although it is important to respect
the associational rights of the social group member, discrimination
against the less powerful which tends to keep them disadvantaged
is action not expression and as such is subject to governmental
regulation. 151
Moreover, the Supreme Court has clearly indicated that free-
dom of expressive association is subject to restrictions when
weighed against the compelling interest of the state. Groups seek-
ing to discriminate against women or other minority groups will
face an extremely strong state interest in eradicating inequality.
The only area in which a private club may have a predominant
right to discriminate involves "intimate association." Unfortu-
nately, courts have not defined the parameters of this protection.
Clearly, the family group would be beyond anti-discrimination pro-
visions of public accommodations statutes, but where do we go
149 Cf. Goodwin, supra note 7, at 270 (need to balance countervailing interests).
150 See Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 4
(1964). "[A]ny general right of association must be subordinate to the individual right." Id.
at 5. However, this understanding still does not fully resolve the conflict between the right
of the individual to be left alone to associate freely only with those whom he or she desires,
and the occasionally conflicting right of another individual to be treated as an individual
and not to be barred from significant areas of our society due solely to racial, ethnic, reli-
gious, or sexual discrimination.
... See Emerson, supra note 150, at 4. See also Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959). Professor Wechsler has suggested that
the forced integration of schools could properly be viewed as an infringement on the per-
sonal freedoms of those forced to associate, against their wishes, with others. See id. Recog-
nizing that there was a clash between these conflicting values, Professor Wechsler has
pointed out that he bad no neutral answer to this dilemma. See id. It is important to distin-
guish the club that genuninely selects from among individual applicants on some reasonable
basis from the club that excludes a substantial sector of the public based on stereotypical
views. See Note, supra note 20, at 1123. If a club is broadly discriminatory, although not
open to all, the club is open to a certain social class within society and does not merit
protection as intimate association. See id.
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from there? Can a small social group that meets weekly in a public
restaurant be required to admit persons with whom they do not
wish to associate? 15 2 Interestingly, most of the groups being chal-
lenged have not been local chapters refusing to admit women, but
the large parent organizations sanctioning the local groups for at-
tempting to exercise their own associational freedoms.
Any comprehensive scheme balancing the rights of the group
against the rights of the individual in the area of private club dis-
crimination must focus on the careful definition of a "private"
club. To avoid statutory controls and fall within constitutional pro-
tections, the club should not contain any commercial elements.
The elements of selectivity and congeniality must be prime consid-
erations in reaching a determination as to the existence of a truly
private club. Although the sliding scale implied by the Roberts and
Rotary Club Courts needs further elaboration and clarification,
courts should make it clear that groups will not be allowed to util-
ize the rubric of "privacy" to deny equal treatment to entire clas-
ses of citizens in organizations that have business-like qualities
rather than the intimate qualities displayed in family and small
group settings. 153 Thus, the legislative approach in New York
City's Local Law 63 may provide a paradigm for other jurisdictions
seeking to balance the right of equal access to public accommoda-
tions against the freedom of association.
Hyman Hacker
152 See Douglas, supra note 1, at 1379. Goodwin suggests that associational rights based
on social needs deserve greater protection than similar economically oriented rights. See
Goodwin, supra note 7, at 281. See also Emerson, supra note 150, at 21 ("expression" ac-
corded broad protection against governmental intrusion; "action" subject to "reasonable and
nondiscriminatory" regulations to effectuate legitimate social interests).
153 See Karst, supra note 48, at 340. In response to arguments that minorities and
women have their own associations, Professor Karst says this is merely a:
consolation prize, a defensive identification in response to exclusion. Both the Na-
tion's need for unity and the individual's need for connection will be best served
when our constitutional law makes it possible for everyone, whatever his or her
cultural identity, to participate as a full member of the larger American commu-
nity, knowing that he or she belongs to America.
Id. at 340.

